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The Role of Discretion in Professional Practice* 
Abstract 
Various scholars of ethics and economics conduct research on the best modes of 
decision making which guarantee good outcome and moral behaviour of the indi-
viduals involved. Either of the modes considered, rules with regulations or discre-
tion and judgment, find applicability in diversified professional circumstances. The 
paper investigates how discretion can be used in professional activity by using the 
Aristotelic-Thomistic framework. Results indicate that such a framework can be 
used by engineers in their working environments and by other working profession-
als with the main proposition that only in discretionary decision making is the per-
son able to take full responsibility for the outcomes and to premeditate their moral 
worth in conscience before resolving to commit the act itself. 
Keywords:  personalistic professionalism in engineering ethics, discretion, human 
decision making, conscience, truth 
JEL Classification: A13, D81 
1. Introdution 
So far few attempts have been made to provide an in-depth insight into the process 
of committing a moral act by a professional human being, with the help of either 
rules or discretion. Even fewer attempts were made to combine these internal and 
external processes into the seamless operation of a human being. This paper shows 
how it is applicable to use discretion in professional ethical judgment. 
                                                          
* The article provides a continuation of reasoning presented by the author in the paper published in “An-
nales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym/Annales. Ethics in Economic Life” a year ago (P. Wajszczyk, Dis-
cretion in Professional Practice and in Engineering Ethics, “Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym” 
2015, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2015, pp. 129–136) 
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It shall be argued that the discretion of an acting person can only result in moral 
choices when acts are done with the whole involvement of the acting person’s inner 
faculties rather than impersonally. Only then are appropriate virtues built and pro-
fessional skills combined with them. 
2. Rules vs. discretion in the economic and professional literature 
Davis1 was one of the few authors in the professional engineering literature who 
recognized the importance of professional judgment for science and engineering 
practice. To be a minimally competent engineer, ‘(…) one must be able to identify 
fruitful problems, investigate them in the appropriate way, and draw useful conclu-
sions.’2 Since there is no single reliable algorithm for doing this in either science or 
engineering, central importance is placed on judgment and personal discretion for 
doing it rightly and reliably. It is especially important for ethical professional be-
haviour. 
There are two opposing views on what to rely on during professional moral 
conduct. One group of views recommends the reliance on rules, which are more 
applicable in certain circumstances, while the other recommends personal discre-
tion. A range of studies in the economic and professional literature is devoted to the 
investigation of the relationship between professional discretion and the narrow, 
specific outcomes of vocational practice. 
Rules are best to be depended on in cases of high systemic risk, whenever an 
individual is incapable of predicting the probability of a natural disaster and coping 
with it.3 Obligatory private insurance options with hazard rate dependent insurance 
costs, partly subsidized by the state, should be the more efficient solution than there 
be sole dependence on the free market discretionary behaviour of land and property 
owners. 
Rules can be mixed with discretionary actions in the form of exceptions to an 
established rule, if there is local information shared by the action taker and a second 
party who is able to verify for the larger group that an exception is warranted. The 
second party can then either excuse ex ante the action taker for the discretionary act 
or forgive a rule-breaking actor ex post.4 
In the context of the producer-customer interface which operates using mass 
customization technologies, an important challenge there was the design of appro-
priate work roles and the management of task discretion in a product-service envi-
ronment. The control of such task discretion5 was achieved by limiting customer 
                                                          
1 M. Davis, A Plea for Judgment, “Science and Engineering Ethics” 2012, Vol. 18, p. 789. 
2 Ibidem, p. 790. 
3 H. Kunreuther, M. Pauly, Rules Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, “Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty” 2006, Vol. 33, p. 103. 
4 T.R. Bowen, D.M. Kreps, A. Skrzypacz, Rules with Discretion and Local Information, “The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics” 2013, pp. 1273–1320. 
5 Discretion was defined there as: ‘(…) the freedom or authority to make judgements and to act as one 
sees fit, which is understood as the role holder’s ability to make procedural decisions (the independence 
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interaction to predefined encounters. This interaction prompted some organizations 
to separate the front-line from back-office work, with greater degree of discretion 
at the front-line emphasizing planning, selection and control of staff, customers and 
their codified interactions – all to achieve the target of a positive experience. This 
development indicates that the discretion in services offered can be manageable. 
Managerial discretion is subject to research investigation in many separate 
pieces of research. It is ‘(…) the strategic freedom to act, or the latitude of action 
that managers have when they formulate strategic activities, including implementa-
tion of organizational structure, determination of corporate development strategy 
and execution of technology transformations.’6 It has been found that when manag-
ers are given greater autonomy to organize management and service practices, their 
discretional abilities can actively enhance the discretion–performance relationship 
through task autonomy, contractual control and management compensation.7 
Studies carried out among high-level management show how different mana-
gerial environments influence investors’ and boards’ reactions to third-party en-
dorsements of managerial (CEO) quality differentiated according to (i.a.) the levels 
of managerial discretion (high vs. low).8 
There are also analyses into how contractual incentives influence managerial 
discretion of asset write-downs in the context of the imposition of stricter verifica-
tion standards (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) vs. discretionary con-
servatism in accounting.9 
Melé presented some shortcomings to approaches of ethical education in ac-
counting which pertain to rules and principles, and values and virtues, which are 
treated in a fragmentary manner. He posited that the primary goal for ethical edu-
cation in accounting ‘should be to impact on the ethical behaviour of those receiving 
this education and not only to provide a set of theories and tools to solve ethical 
dilemmas.’10 This should be done with character and virtues, which are a matter of 
personal moral development rather than exclusively knowledge. 
Arnaud and Wasieleski trace how managerial discretion helps in development 
and maintenance of socially responsible outcomes at the individual level of the Cor-
porate Social Performance model, assessing a firm’s social responsibility.11 
                                                          
from others when making those decisions).’ J. Angelis, G. Parry, M. Macintyre, Discretion and Com-
plexity in Customer Focused Environments, “European Management Journal” 2012, Vol. 30, p. 468. 
6 Y. Yan, Ch.Ch. Yan, S. Mak, An Exploration of Managerial Discretion and Its Impact on Firm Per-
formance: Task Autonomy, Contractual Control, and Compensation, “International Business Review” 
2010, Vol. 19, p. 521. 
7 Ibidem, p. 528. 
8 T.L. Waldron, S.D. Graffin, J.F. Porac, J.B. Wade, Third-party Endorsements of CEO Quality, Managerial 
Discretion, and Stakeholder Reactions, “Journal of Business Research” 2013, Vol. 66, pp. 2592–2599. 
9 S. Roychowdhury, X. Martin, Understanding Discretion in Conservatism: An Alternative Viewpoint, 
“Journal of Accounting and Economics” 2013, Vol. 56, pp. 134–146. 
10 D. Melé, Ethical Education in Accounting: Integrating Rules, Values and Virtues, “Journal of Business 
Ethics” 2005, Vol. 57, p. 106. 
11 S. Arnaud, D.M. Wasieleski, Corporate Humanistic Responsibility: Social Performance through Man-
agerial Discretion of the HRM, “Journal of Business Ethics” 2014, Vol. 120, pp. 313–334. 
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Sahaym et al. investigate how capacity to offer innovative products, uncer-
tainty, and managerial discretion has an impact on export driven internationaliza-
tion.12 
Naveh finds that unrestricted discretion in R&D projects offers a more positive 
relationship between formality and performance achievement in R&D projects than 
in projects with restricted members’ discretion.13 
Aragón-Correa et al. consider possible links between executive discretion and 
corporate environmental commitment. Their survey results from 105 firms show 
that a firm’s environmental commitment is correlated with the responsibility of spe-
cific executives for environmental matters. This environmental commitment was 
found to be linked with those executives who had high levels of managerial discre-
tion.14 
Discretion is also considered to be a time-dependent phenomenon. Hutzschen-
reuter and Kleindienst develop an in-depth analysis of managerial discretion and its 
operation in strategic issue array. They develop a conceptual model by considering 
managerial discretion as a continuum of options with two constraints: those of 
which the manager is aware (MA) and those contained in the zone of acceptance 
(ZoA). Managerial discretion is then expressed as MA∩ZoA with three sets of co-
variates: personal characteristics, relational characteristics and situational charac-
teristics.15 
In the field of judiciary discretion, Einat analysed the link between sentencing 
rationales, judiciary discretion, and fining policy, especially the confidence in the 
ability of the criminal fine to successfully achieve different penal objectives, while 
in a comparative study Cooter and Ginsburg investigated the influence of factors on 
the relative amount of judicial discretion across different legal systems.16 
There is a certain characteristic visible in the above literature: the authors, by 
uncovering relationships among the investigated concepts, create knowledge rules 
to be taken into account by the researchers and decision makers whenever they en-
counter the problems addressed by the authors. Little space and researchers’ atten-
tion however, has been devoted to the subjects who find themselves in situations 
requiring the use of discretion. The literature sources quoted above seem to ignore 
the inner structure and dynamism of the acting persons behind the acts described. 
                                                          
12 A. Sahaym, L.J. Treviño, H.K. Steensma, The influence of managerial discretion, innovation and un-
certainty on export intensity: A real options perspective, “International Business Review” 2012, Vol. 21, 
pp. 1131–1147. 
13 E. Naveh, Formality and discretion in successful R&D projects, “Journal of Operations Management” 
2007, Vol. 25, pp. 110–125. 
14 J.A. Aragón-Correa, F. Matías-Reche, M.E. Senise-Barrio, Managerial discretion and corporate com-
mitment to the natural environment, “Journal of Business Research” 2004, Vol. 57, pp. 964–975. 
15 T. Hutzschenreuter, I. Kleindienst, (How) Does discretion change over time? A contribution toward 
a dynamic view of managerial discretion, “Scandinavian Journal of Management” 2013, Vol. 29, 
pp. 264–281. 
16 T. Einat, Sentencing rationales, judicial discretion, and the practice of criminal fines in Israel, “Jour-
nal of Criminal Justice” 2008, Vol. 36, pp. 444–452, doi: 10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2008.07.007; R.D. Cooter, 
T. Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, “International 
Review of Law and Economics” 1996, Vol. 16, pp. 295–313. 
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Rules help when making routine choices and making decisions but they de-
prive the action taker from freedom of conscious, premeditated and fully voluntary 
actions. They do not foresee and cover all possible contingencies and they are not 
always specific enough to provide unambiguous guidance which indicates what op-
tions must be taken and which must be avoided. Most often they are based on the 
prior evaluative power of other experts or skilled decision makers who prepare the 
rules to be followed. Therefore, rule compliance and followership do not provide 
fully personal, individual choices, for which full responsibility is taken. 
This procedural reductionism17 inclines the decision makers to reduce all mat-
ters of judgment and responsibility to the following of some procedure or rule. Ex-
amples of this belief can be found in widespread attitudes, especially among the 
professionals, so that we are able to grasp good practice, devise good solutions, and 
make correct moral choices, by following rules and procedures. 
It is the power of one’s own judgment and discretion, to the extent that they 
are valid and accurate, which often marks the true professional decision maker18. 
The sense of discretion, the ‘power of free decision, individual judgment or choice 
within certain legal bounds’19 and the ‘ability to make decisions which represent 
a responsible choice’20 presuppose the awareness of the subject of what is lawful, 
right, or wise in the matter of the discretion. As Hunt rightly remarks: 
(…) professionalism cannot be reduced to the strict observance of procedures or 
rules of accountability. It is certainly a mark of professionalism that behavior is 
constrained and guided by procedures and rules of accountability, [but] it is quite 
wrong to conclude that the more observant one is, the more p r o f e s s i o n a l  
one necessarily is. It is also quite wrong to conclude that the more one constrains 
professional activity with procedures and rules the b e t t e r  (more effective, 
safer, satisfying, happier or whatever) the practice, such as nursing, necessarily 
is. Furthermore, it is wrong to think that whenever something goes wrong, appar-
ently because there is not a procedure that covers that eventuality, all that is 
needed to put things right is another procedure or subprocedure or sub-subpro-
cedure.21 
Following procedures and observing the rules are a good start in professional 
practice and in education. They provide a communicable vehicle offering help to 
the learning students and beginning practitioners in gaining knowledge of what is 
exemplary behaviour, an ideal or a pattern of good practice. Such knowledge is 
more easily accepted by students, since ‘procedure is teachable, wisdom is gained 
by some through living their lives, including their professional lives, in an open and 
responsible spirit. This is what professional discretion is ultimately about.’22 
                                                          
17 G. Hunt, The Human Condition of the Professional: Discretion and Accountability, “Nursing Ethics” 
1997, Vol. 4, No. 6, p. 519. 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2000. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 G. Hunt, op. cit., p. 521–522. 
22 Ibidem. 
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But for responsible conduct and moral professional development mere 
knowledge transfer is not enough: active discussion, personal involvement, problem 
solving and hands-on experience of participative practice are necessary instead.23 
3. Discretion in engineering profession 
Within the discipline of engineering, in which speculative inquiry prevails, practice 
is the end – the applicability of the end results. Therefore, the principles derived 
from the research form a foundation of knowledge which is practical science. The 
decisions and abilities to apply the end results, be the new technologies, novel prod-
ucts, production techniques, invented constructions or just scientific principles in 
a particular situation, is the art of practice. 
Speculative intellectual virtues perfect the intellect, but not the will or the ha-
bitual part of professional dispositions. An engineer may be well educated and of 
excellent knowledge about how to make efficient designs of civil constructions, 
mechanical machinery, how to behave in various situations and even learn what is 
the morally correct behaviour. Such knowledge is merely the perfection of the in-
tellect. But the same engineer, if placed in such a challenging situation, may fail to 
stand up to the challenges. He could make the wrong use of the invention, or design, 
or behave immorally. 
Examples involving decisions using some extent of discretion are most often 
yes/no decisions: to permit a building for public use, to issue/suspend a professional 
license, to issue a homologation certificate for an airplane, train, ship, car, ferry, 
traffic control system, etc. These complex and multistage decisions are usually re-
inforced by scores of specific standards, rules and conditions, all designed to make 
the final decision easier and right, but it is always some person who makes it in the 
end. Behind the multiple checks lists and cross checks there is always personal dis-
cretion and judgment that these machines or systems can safely and reliably operate 
within the specified fields of use with no detrimental effects to human health, life 
or welfare. 
Discretion operates correctly whenever the decision maker uses truth as the 
principle upon which his decision or action is based. The usage of truth as a moral 
value rather than a scientific one has another advantage. The intent of the words and 
statements accurately reflect the dispositions of the mind of the speaker. Verity and 
truth telling, so often included as professional virtues in codes of professional engi-
neering ethics, find a more comprehensive justification here. This enables the pro-
fessional his or her personal moral development in the process of using discretion, 
conscientious judgment, prudence-related virtues, their habituation and delibera-
tion. 
                                                          
23 M. Davis, op. cit., p. 790. 
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4. Conclusion 
In the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical system there is a fundamental difference be-
tween actus hominis (an act of a man)24 and actus humanus (a human act).25 While 
the first one denotes a man’s act which does not involve the wholeness of his person, 
the other includes both human reason, (free) will, acting conscience and good habits 
– the components of the inner person’s structure.26 Whenever a person actively in-
volves these personal faculties in the act, it is called human and attains a moral 
value. Not all of the acts are moral acts, only those which are conscious, rational 
and wilfully committed. 
In the expositions of this paper and the previous one27 it is clear that rules and 
regulations provide such a capacity for human acts to the extent that they allow for 
the involvement of the aforementioned personal faculties. As we have observed, 
this may be problematic and, when acts are repeated on a routine basis with short-
cuts or without deliberation, they do not involve the whole human personality. Thus, 
they may not contain moral value or they may not be good acts. For example, a ‘pro-
fessional’ person may commit deeply evil acts, even without being cognizant of 
them, and give reasons for it by stating ‘I have only followed the prescripts of the 
law and rules of practice,’ thereby suggesting that his own conscience and deliber-
ation of the acts were not in operation while the acts had been committed.28 
The review of the economic and professional literature suggests that the au-
thors discern cases where rule-driven decision making should be made from those 
in which the decision makers should rely on their own discretion. In fact, the above 
analysis rather suggests that, in terms of the moral value of an action taken, there 
should be no difference between these two categories if the moral decision is to be 
taken by a professional person. Whether rules or the discretion are in use, the right 
decision is right no matter what helped more to make it. A good act is good no 
matter what helped the action taker to carry it out, whether good rules or well-made 
discretion followed by judgment – the good act is objectively good. What do make 
the difference in making a decision, or committing an act by a human person, are 
the components necessary for the correct decision and the good act, especially those 
discussed earlier in this paper. Whether the whole person participates in the act, 
only in part, or just passively and automatically follows the rules, this makes a fun-
damental difference on the moral value and the effects of the act. In the first case, it 
is truly moral and the effects are twofold: external (outside the person) and internal 
to the person. In the case of automated followership, only the external effect appears 
without (or with very limited) internal personal effect. When subsequent acts are 
                                                          
24 Cf. T. Aquinas, Summa theologica, Ia IIae, q.18 a.2,3. 
25 Cf. ibidem, Ia IIae, q.6 seqq.; q.18 a.1,4,5; q. 21 a.1,3,4. 
26 Good intention, good end and other components of the structure of a human act were not discussed 
here for space limitations. 
27 P. Wajszczyk, op. cit. 
28 Similar effect can result when a person follows internal organizational rules, regulations or instructions 
without own conscientious discretion based on deliberation. 
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morally good they contribute to the development of good habits, the person’s per-
manent abilities to act morally well. In such a way, professional practice may be 
complemented by the moral development of an acting person. Future studies should 
investigate the applicability of the proposed Aristotelian-Thomistic framework in 
field research and find out the extent to which various professional people use it in 
their personal and organizational behaviours. 
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